Don\u27t Be Cruel (Anymore): A Look at the Animal Cruelty Regimes of the United States and Brazil with A Call for A New Animal Welfare Agency by Cassuto, David N
Pace University 
DigitalCommons@Pace 
Pace Law Faculty Publications School of Law 
2016 
Don't Be Cruel (Anymore): A Look at the Animal Cruelty Regimes 
of the United States and Brazil with A Call for A New Animal 
Welfare Agency 
David N. Cassuto 
Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Agriculture Law Commons, Animal Law Commons, and the 
Comparative and Foreign Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
David N. Cassuto & Cayleigh Eckhardt, Don't Be Cruel (Anymore): A Look at the Animal Cruelty Regimes of 
the United States and Brazil with A Call for A New Animal Welfare Agency, 43 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 1 
(2016), http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty/1018/. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Pace Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. 
For more information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu. 
  
1 
DON’T BE CRUEL (ANYMORE): A LOOK AT 
THE ANIMAL CRUELTY REGIMES OF THE 
UNITED STATES AND BRAZIL WITH A 
CALL FOR A NEW ANIMAL  
WELFARE AGENCY 
DAVID N. CASSUTO* 
CAYLEIGH ECKHARDT** 
No man who has passed a month in the death cells believes in cages for 
beasts. 
—Ezra Pound (from the Pisan Cantos) 
Abstract: In the United States and around the world, animals exploited for hu-
man use suffer cruel and needless harm. The group bearing the brunt of this ex-
ploitation—agricultural animals—is routinely exempted from the largely inef-
fective and rarely enforced animal welfare and anti-cruelty regulations that exist 
today. This Article offers a comparative analysis of the agricultural animal wel-
fare regimes of two countries with globally significant presence in the agricul-
ture industry: the United States and Brazil. Even though the two countries ap-
proach agricultural animal welfare differently, they arrive at the same outcome: 
institutionalized indifference to animal suffering. To remedy the current regula-
tory structure, this Article proposes the creation of an independent federal agen-
cy—The Animal Welfare Agency (“AWA”)—to regulate the safety and welfare 
of all animals, including those used in agriculture. The AWA could significantly 
reduce systemic animal cruelty in both the United States and Brazil and repre-
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sent an important step toward inserting morality and ethics into our relationships 
with animals. 
INTRODUCTION 
Cruelty to animals is commonly defined as a malicious or criminally 
negligent act that causes an animal to suffer pain or death.1 Historically, 
animal anti-cruelty statutes in the United States were enacted because, “[I]f 
left to its own devices, society would exploit animals without regard to 
moral or ethical consideration.”2 Judging by the vast and increasing number 
of exploited animals, these statutes have had little of the desired impact.3 
Over 9.1 billion land animals are killed in the United States for food each 
year.4 For most of them, their lives (and deaths) occur outside of the law’s 
protection, with little thought given to their well-being.5 In fact, many states 
specifically exempt farm animals from anti-cruelty statutes.6 This prac-
tice—excluding agricultural animals from anti-cruelty protections—is not 
unique to the United States. Rather, it is the norm globally, and the resulting 
animal suffering reaches an almost incomprehensible scale.7 
In an effort to understand the rationale behind excluding agricultural 
animals from legal protections, this Article offers a comparative analysis of 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Cruelty, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). States do vary in their codified defini-
tion of cruelty, but usually incorporate the concept of unnecessary, needless, or unjustified suffer-
ing into their definitions. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 77 (2015) (illegal to “inflict[] unneces-
sary cruelty upon [an animal], or unnecessarily fail[] to provide it with proper food, drink, shelter, 
sanitary environment, or protection from the weather”); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 97-41-1 (2015) 
(misdemeanor to “unjustifiably injure . . . or needlessly mutilate[] or kill[], any living creature”); 
N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 353 (McKinney 2015) (misdemeanor to “unjustifiably injure[], 
maim[], mutilate[] or kill[] any animal”). 
 2 David J. Wolfson, Beyond the Law: Agribusiness and the Systemic Abuse of Animals Raised 
for Food or Food Production, 2 ANIMAL L. 123, 148 (1996). 
 3 See Farm Animal Statistics: Slaughter Totals, HUMANE SOC’Y OF THE U.S., http://www.humane
society.org/news/resources/research/stats_slaughter_totals.html [http://perma.cc/M9XR-ZT2M] (last 
updated June 25, 2015). 
 4 Id. 
 5 See Gaverick Matheny & Cheryl Leahy, Farm-Animal Welfare, Legislation, and Trade, 70 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 325, 326 (2007) (noting that excluding water animals from these fig-
ures is more a function of societal practice (and prejudice) than an acknowledgment that their 
plight is any less dire, and that aquaculture as well as open water fishing are responsible for bil-
lions more deaths and unquantifiable suffering); David E. Solan, Et Tu Lisa Jackson? An Econom-
ic Case for Why the EPA’s Sweeping Environmental Regulatory Agenda Hurts Animal Welfare on 
Factory Farms, 8 J. ANIMAL & NAT. RESOURCE L. 27, 34–36 (2012). 
 6 David J. Wolfson & Mariann Sullivan, Foxes in the Henhouse: Animals, Agribusiness and 
the Law: A Modern American Fable, in ANIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIREC-
TIONS 205, 207 (Cass R. Sunstein & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2004). 
 7 Stephanie J. Engelsman, “Word Leader” —At What Price? A Look at Lagging American 
Animal Protection Law, 22 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 329, 332 (2005). 
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two countries—Brazil and the United States. We selected these countries 
because their respective animal agricultural regimes have global signifi-
cance and impact,8 and because their legal systems are dissimilar in ap-
proach but similar in result. Like the United States, Brazil exempts agricul-
tural animals from legal protections afforded to other animals.9 However, 
unlike the United States, Brazil’s Constitution explicitly recognizes a fun-
damental right of humane treatment for animals.10 Still, Brazilian agricul-
tural animals remain vulnerable to systemic abuse.11 This Article explores 
why these two countries’ varying approaches to animal cruelty arrive at 
substantially the same end. Profit clearly serves as a driving force in both 
countries but does not necessarily explain the institutionalized indifference 
to suffering. One can seek profit while still remaining sensitive to the im-
pacts on others. There are many examples of entities that have done well 
financially while remaining mindful of social responsibilities.12 
                                                                                                                           
 8 See David N. Cassuto & Sarah Saville, Hot, Crowded, and Legal: A Look at Industrial Ag-
riculture in the United States and Brazil, 18 ANIMAL L. 185, 195, 201 (2012). The United States 
has only five percent of the world’s population yet consumes fifteen percent of the world’s ani-
mals. Id. at 195. It is also the place where industrial agriculture began. Id. at 191. Brazil is one of 
the world’s leading exporters of cattle and chicken and one of the largest live exporters, as well. 
Id. at 200. “From 1995–2010, Brazil’s cattle herd increased 27%, national beef production in-
creased 38%, and the county’s exports jumped by 731%.” Id. at 201. 
 9 Id. at 202–03; see DIRECTORATE GEN. FOR HEALTH & CONSUMER PROT., EUROPEAN 
COMM’N, ANIMAL WELFARE 1 (2007), http://ec.europa.eu/food/animals/docs/aw_efsa_opinions_
factsheet_farmed03-2007_en.pdf [http://perma.cc/529N-5C7P]; infra notes 146–178 and accom-
panying text (noting that Brazil’s regulations pertaining to animals used in agriculture conform to 
European Union standards, which are more rigorous than those of the United States). See general-
ly WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS: 2011 (2011), http://siteresources.world
bank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/wdi_ebook.pdf [https://perma.cc/7YQY-LYBN] (provid-
ing statistical information about world development indicators, showing differences in develop-
ment and quality of life around the world). 
 10 See CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 225 (Braz.) (stating that the fed-
eral government must “protect the fauna and flora . . . [from] practices that endanger their ecologi-
cal function, cause the extinction of species or subject animals to cruelty”) (trans.) (emphasis 
added). 
 11 Tagore Trajano de Almeida Silva, Brazilian Animal Law Overview: Balancing Human and 
Non-Human Interests, 6 J. ANIMAL L. 81, 86 (2010) (stating that laboratory animals also exist in a 
form of legal limbo: on the one hand, they have constitutional protections, on the other, the law 
permits their use and exploitation); see Raul Gallegos, Beagle Brutality Sets Off Brazil, BLOOM-
BERG VIEW (Oct. 31, 2013, 8:18 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-10-31/beagle-
brutality-sets-off-brazil-.html [http://perma.cc/N8CK-B97A] (noting that in October 2013, Brazil-
ian animal-rights activists broke into a laboratory and freed 178 beagles to both rescue the animals 
and communicate their desire to ban laboratory animal testing); Chesney Hearst, Animal Cruelty 
Debate Continues: Daily, RIO TIMES (Oct. 27, 2013), http://riotimesonline.com/brazil-news/rio-
politics/animal-cruelty-debate-continues/# [http://perma.cc/D3N2-LYDQ]. 
 12 See, e.g., Brad Tuttle, Chipotle Pulls Pulled Pork from 600 of Its Restaurants, TIME (Jan. 14, 
2015), http://time.com/money/3667333/chipotle-pork-carnitas-shortage/ [http://perma.cc/BBL3-
AZHN]; Animal Welfare Standards, WHOLE FOODS MKT., http://www.wholefoodsmarket.com/
about-our-products/quality-standards/animal-welfare-standards [http://perma.cc/9L7K-X43D]; Whole 
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Part I of this Article provides an overview of the regulatory regimes of 
the two countries with respect to agricultural animals.13 Although each has 
laws mandating “humane treatment,” the scope and nature of that term leave 
much to interpretation. In the United States, for example, the principal fed-
eral statute supposedly guaranteeing humane treatment is the Federal Meat 
Inspection Act (“FMIA”), a law whose very title indicates that (living) ani-
mal protection is not the priority.14 Brazil’s laws are similarly riven with 
internal contradiction.15 
Part II explores the countries’ across-the-board exemptions for agricul-
tural animals in almost all animal cruelty legislation or regulation.16 Part III 
examines how political pressure from the agricultural industry, consumer 
demand, and laws aimed at incentivizing the production of animal products 
rather than maximizing animal welfare have resulted in subsidies (in the 
United States), favorable regulatory structures (in both countries), and a 
proliferation of inhumane practices.17 
Finally, Part IV offers a potential solution to the entrenchment of agri-
cultural practices that fail to adequately account for animal welfare in both 
the United States and Brazil.18 There must be a new regulatory body devot-
ed to the conditions of animals. Specifically, we call for the creation of a 
federal agency—The Animal Welfare Agency (“AWA”)—to regulate animal 
safety and welfare.19 The AWA would assume responsibility for animal wel-
fare from existing regulatory bodies, thereby removing the potential for 
agency capture and conflict.20 The agency would have jurisdiction over all 
animal welfare. However, because the majority of animals and animal mis-
treatment occurs in agriculture, the focus here is on agricultural animals.21 
                                                                                                                           
Foods Begins Animal Welfare Labeling, HOARD’S DAIRYMAN (Mar. 30, 2011), http://www.hoards.
com/blog_whole_foods [http://perma.cc/X3JZ-6UQR]; Why Did Chipotle Stop Serving Carnitas?, 
CHIPOTLE.COM, http://chipotle.com/carnitas [http://perma.cc/H98Y-BZGJ] (explaining that Chipotle 
stopped serving carnitas in many restaurants because a supplier violated some of Chipotle’s animal 
welfare standards). 
 13 See infra notes 26–178 and accompanying text. 
 14 Federal Meat Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 601–695 (2012); see also Humane Methods of 
Slaughter Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1902 (2012) (regulated by the Department of Agriculture); Ani-
mal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131–2159; Twenty Eight Hour Law, 49 U.S.C. § 80502 (2012) 
(protecting animals during transportation to slaughter); Cassuto & Saville, supra note 8, at 203. 
 15 See Lei No. 9.605, de 12 de Fevereiro de 1998, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 
13.2.1998 (Braz.). 
 16 See infra notes 179–212 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 213–264 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 266–326 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 269–326 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 273–285, 298–315 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 286–294, 316–317 and accompanying text. 
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We further demonstrate how an AWA could be successfully established in 
Brazil and the United States.22 
The Article concludes with a brief discussion of the potential im-
provements in animal welfare, worker and food safety, and environmental 
protection offered by our proposed Agency.23 Realpolitik and powerful eco-
nomic interests guarantee that this proposal will face a difficult road, and 
require a great deal of political courage and will. However, the degree of 
difficulty is dwarfed by the necessity for action. Billions of animals die in 
horrible agony every year in the United States and Brazil.24 Considering the 
economic and political power the agricultural industry possesses in both 
countries, a suggestion to ban industrialized agricultural production is not 
workable.25 The purpose of this Article is to offer ideas for improving ani-
mal welfare based on current realities. The present regulatory structure is 
irremediably flawed; it is time for a new start. 
I. LEGAL TREATMENT OF ANIMALS IN THE AGRICULTURAL INDUSTRY 
Both Brazil and the United States recognize the need for laws protect-
ing animals from cruelty.26 These laws vary in scope from region to re-
gion.27 However, neither country provides adequate protection for animals 
within the agricultural industry. Because agricultural animals are viewed as 
food, and food is necessary for life, the suffering of animals raised for food 
has traditionally been viewed as unavoidable.28 
This notion of necessity contains an embedded and ironic double 
standard. Anti-cruelty laws, even applied to agricultural animals, usually 
outlaw the infliction of “unnecessary” suffering.29 Necessity, as a legal con-
cept, is typically defined from the perspective of the potential victim; for 
                                                                                                                           
 22 See infra notes 269–326 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 318–326 and accompanying text. 
 24 See supra notes 4–7 and accompanying text (noting that billions of animals suffer and die 
for food in the United States); infra notes 170–178 and accompanying text (describing how the 
hundreds of thousands of cattle killed annually for food in Brazil suffer terribly). 
 25 See infra notes 213–264 and accompanying text. 
 26 See, e.g., CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 225 (Braz.); Animal Wel-
fare Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131–2159 (2012). 
 27 See Constituição Federal [C.F.] [Constitution] art. 225 (Braz.); 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131–2159; 
infra notes 46–105 and accompanying text. 
 28 Wolfson, supra note 2, at 148. See generally David N. Cassuto, Meat Animals, Humane 
Standards and Other Legal Fictions, LAW, CULTURE & HUMAN. (forthcoming), http://digital
commons.pace.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1874&context=lawfaculty [perma.cc/LJZ8-83L9] 
(detailing how supposedly humane federal practices ignore the brutal treatment of “food animals”). 
 29 See Frida Lundmark et al., ‘Unnecessary Suffering’ as a Concept in Animal Welfare Legis-
lation and Standards, in THE ETHICS OF CONSUMPTION: THE CITIZEN, THE MARKET AND THE 
LAW 114, 114–15 (H. Rocklinsberg & P. Sandin eds., 2013). 
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example, one can kill in self-defense when it is necessary to avoid deadly 
harm to oneself.30 In that instance, the victim of an attack can inflict suffer-
ing upon her attacker to avoid a potentially worse outcome (her own death). 
The law recognizes that the death of the attacker is preferable to the death 
of the victim. 
That relationship between potential victim and legal necessity is in-
verted in the case of animal cruelty. For example, no one would argue that it 
is necessary for a calf to be castrated in order for that calf to avoid a worse 
fate. Rather, the business interests of the human owner of the calf—the enti-
ty inflicting the suffering—take precedence over the calf’s well-being and 
bodily integrity. Thus, because it is more profitable for the calf’s owner to 
remove the calf’s testicles (rendering it more docile and therefore more 
manageable), it becomes justifiable and legally “necessary” to castrate the 
calf.31 
There are several discrete but linked ideas within this rationale that di-
verge from the standard logic of cruelty, necessity, and common sense. 
First, as mentioned, necessity is judged not from the perspective of the vic-
tim but rather that of the instigator of the suffering.32 This raises a jurispru-
dential question: if an animal’s suffering is irrelevant to the determination of 
necessity, can the animal enduring cruelty legitimately be classified as a 
victim?33 This question leads one to then inquire whether legitimate victims 
can actually exist under animal cruelty statutes.34 
Second, the idea of necessity in the animal cruelty context revolves 
around economics.35 For instance, debeaking chickens or docking the tails 
of pigs or dairy cattle makes it easier to confine the animals in very close 
                                                                                                                           
 30 See, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:20 (2015) (stating that homicide is justifiable when commit-
ted in self-defense); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15 (McKinney 2015) (describing that a person may 
use deadly physical force for self-defense against another that he believes will use deadly force 
upon him). 
 31 GARY FRANCIONE, ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 26 (1995) (noting that no anesthesia 
is used when carrying out the procedure). See generally AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS’N, LITERATURE 
REVIEW ON THE WELFARE IMPLICATIONS OF CASTRATION OF CATTLE (2014), https://www.
avma.org/KB/Resources/LiteratureReviews/Documents/castration-cattle-bgnd.pdf [http://perma.
cc/79JT-K85B] (explaining the current lack of use of anesthesia in the castration procedure while 
advocating for the benefits of using anesthesia to minimize the animal’s pain and stress associated 
with the castration process). 
 32 FRANCIONE, supra note 31, at 26. 
 33 See generally Luis E. Chiesa, Why Is It a Crime to Stomp on a Goldfish?—Harm, Victim-
hood and the Structure of Anti-Cruelty Offenses, 78 MISS. L.J. 1 (2008) (arguing that society has 
decided to criminalize harm to animals primarily out of concern for the well-being of such crea-
tures, not because doing so furthers some other human interest). 
 34 See id. at 34 (explaining that though widely misperceived, cruelty laws are in fact meant to 
protect animal victims). 
 35 See FRANCIONE, supra note 31, at 26. 
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quarters.36 The industry maintains that these procedures, which result in 
lasting pain and discomfort for the animals, nevertheless increase the yield 
of animal products.37 In the eyes of the law, that economic benefit translates 
into “necessity.” 
In no other context with which the authors are familiar does profit de-
termine whether the infliction of suffering is legally necessary. Nonetheless, 
as animal agriculture has industrialized, economic gain has become ever 
more determinative of animal welfare.38 Furthermore, as has been widely 
discussed, modern agricultural practices differ significantly from those of 
small farms of the past, both in the systematization and the sheer scale of 
the suffering they inflict.39 This section provides an overview of the treat-
ment of agricultural animals in the United States and Brazil.40 
A. Regulation in the United States 
In the United States, the few federal animal protection laws that exist 
deal primarily with transport and slaughterhouse protocols.41 The rest is left 
to the states.42 Unfortunately, most states exempt “common” or “normal” 
                                                                                                                           
 36 DAVID FAVRE, ANIMAL LAW: WELFARE, INTERESTS, AND RIGHTS 293 (2008). 
 37 See generally Gulnaz Shaheen, Factory Farming: A Cruel Practice, 3 AYER 91 (2015) 
(explaining the cruelty present in farming operations). 
 38 Michael Pollan, Farmer in Chief, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/
2008/10/12/magazine/12policy-t.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FPollan%2C%20Michael
&action=click&contentCollection=timestopics&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=la
test&contentPlacement=37&pgtype=collection. See generally David N. Cassuto, Owning What 
You Eat: The Discourse of Food, 4 REVISTA BRASILERIA DE DIREITO ANIMAL 45 (2009) (ex-
plaining that industrial agriculture has refashioned animal husbandry into a mechanized process 
that ignores historic methods of human/nonhuman animal interaction). 
 39 Elizabeth A. Overcash, Comment, Unwarranted Discrepancies in the Advancement of 
Animal Law: The Growing Disparity in Protection Between Companion Animals and Agricultural 
Animals, 90 N.C. L. REV. 837, 875–76 (2012). See generally Joyce D’Silva, Adverse Impact of 
Industrial Animal Agriculture on the Health and Welfare of Farmed Animals, 1 INTEGRATIVE 
ZOOLOGY 53 (2006) (explaining how maximizing productivity has been the driving force in the 
increasingly intensive nature of the farming of animals, and has resulted in serious threats to the 
health and welfare of the animals involved); JOYCE D’SILVA & PETER STEVENSON, COMPASSION 
IN WORLD FARMING TR., MODERN BREEDING TECHNOLOGIES AND WELFARE OF FARM ANIMALS 
(1995), https://www.ciwf.org.uk/media/3816969/modern-breeding-technologies-and-farm-animal-
welfare.pdf [http:perma.cc/2UMT-STBR] (discussing how modern methods of breeding are 
threatening farm animal health and welfare). 
 40 See infra notes 41–178 and accompanying text. 
 41 See infra notes 45–73 and accompanying text. 
 42 See GARY L. FRANCIONE, INTRODUCTION TO ANIMAL RIGHTS: YOUR CHILD OR THE DOG? 
56–58 (2000) (explaining the protocols in states including California, Delaware, Kentucky, Mary-
land, Nebraska, Oregon, and Pennsylvania). 
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farming practices from their anti-cruelty statutes.43 Consequently, agricul-
tural animals have little or no legal protection from inhumane treatment.44 
1. Federal Law 
No federal regulations or statutes “govern the way that [agricultural] 
animals are treated from the time that they are born or hatched to the time 
they are sent off to be slaughtered.”45 The few federal laws that do exist 
focus on the animals’ transport, slaughter, or condition immediately prior to 
slaughter, not on the nature of their pre-transport existence.46 
The Humane Methods of Slaughter Act (“HMSA”) is overseen by the 
Department of Agriculture (“USDA”).47 The statute charges the agency 
with regulating the kill methods used in federally approved slaughterhous-
es.48 However, the USDA has determined that the HMSA excludes both 
birds and fish,49even as birds and fish account for roughly ninety-nine per-
cent of farmed animals.50 Thus, the few protections offered by the HMSA 
apply only to the land mammals that comprise the remaining one percent of 
domestically slaughtered animals.51 The HMSA is even further limited be-
cause it exempts ritual slaughter.52 
                                                                                                                           
 43 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-201.5 (2015); IDAHO CODE § 25-3514(5) (2015); 510 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 70/13 (2015); IOWA CODE § 717.2(1)(a), (c) (2015); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-
211(4)(b) (2015); NEV. REV. STAT. § 574.200 (2015); see also Wolfson, supra note 2, at 127–32. 
 44 See infra notes 45–122 and accompanying text (describing the inadequacy of federal and 
state laws in protecting agricultural animals). 
 45 Cheryl L. Leahy, Large-Scale Farmed Animal Abuse and Neglect: Law and Its Enforce-
ment, 4 J. ANIMAL L. & ETHICS 63, 75 (2011); see Humane Methods of Slaughter Act, 7 U.S.C. 
§§ 1901–1907 (2012) (governing animal treatment only as it relates to methods of slaughter); PEW 
COMM’N ON INDUS. FARM ANIMAL PROD., PUTTING MEAT ON THE TABLE: INDUSTRIAL FARM 
ANIMAL PRODUCTION IN AMERICA 30 (2008); see also Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131–
2159 (only regulating the welfare of animals being used for research, which does not include agri-
cultural animals); Twenty Eight Hour Law, 49 U.S.C. § 80502 (2012) (requiring minimum stand-
ards of care for animals during transportation). 
 46 See 7 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1907, 2131–2159; 49 U.S.C. § 80502. 
 47 7 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1902. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id.; see also 9 C.F.R. § 301.2 (2015) (defining livestock as “[c]attle, sheep, swine, goat, 
horse, mule, or other equine”). 
 50 Matheny & Leahy, supra note 5, at 326. 
 51 Rachel Wechsler, Blood on the Hands of the Federal Government: Affirmative Steps That 
Promote Animal Cruelty, 4 J. ANIMAL L. & ETHICS 183, 200–01 (2011). 
 52 7 U.S.C. § 1902(b) (defining humane slaughter to include “slaughtering in accordance with 
the ritual requirements of the Jewish faith or any other religious faith that prescribes a method of 
slaughter whereby the animal suffers loss of consciousness by anemia of the brain caused by the 
simultaneous and instantaneous severance of the carotid arteries with a sharp instrument and han-
dling in connection with such slaughtering”). 
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In addition, the regulations designed to reduce suffering during slaugh-
ter are largely ineffectual.53 For example, though the HMSA requires that 
animals be rendered senseless prior to their being hoisted, shackled, and cut, 
many receive inaccurate stun blows.54 As a result, these poorly stunned an-
imals are often skinned alive.55 Therefore, even the small percentage of an-
imals supposedly protected under the HMSA can still suffer during slaugh-
ter.56 
The second of the two principal federal laws governing the treatment 
of agricultural animals is the FMIA, which pertains to animals once they 
reach the slaughterhouse.57 The FMIA mandates that these animals be treat-
ed humanely only during the slaughter process.58 Yet, the FMIA still allows 
animals who are injured and already suffering to be slaughtered, thus creat-
ing a perverse incentive to mistreat animals prior to their arrival (mistreat-
ment is usually less expensive than humane treatment).59 
In 2012, the United States Supreme Court ruled that Section 599 of the 
California Penal Code, which was amended to provide more slaughterhouse 
protections, was preempted by the FMIA.60 In finding that the FMIA’s ani-
mal welfare standards preempted state law, Justice Kagan references “hu-
mane” treatment only as it relates to slaughterhouses.61 Such a narrow per-
spective excludes most of the animals’ lives and, therefore, much of the 
cruelty they endure. 
A third relevant federal law, Section 80502 of Title 49 of the United 
States Code, known as the “Twenty-Eight Hour Law,” ostensibly provides 
protection for animals during transport to slaughter.62 It requires that live-
stock transported by a common carrier vehicle for over twenty-eight con-
                                                                                                                           
 53 Leahy, supra note 45, at 75–76. 
 54 See 7 U.S.C. § 1902(a); Cassuto, supra note 28, at 4. 
 55 Cassuto, supra note 28, at 4 (“[T]he rapidity of the modern industrial kill line ensures that 
there will inevitably be some inaccurate stun blows. That means that some percentage (even 0.5% 
still amounts to thousands of animals) is not properly stunned. Those poorly stunned animals are 
often skinned alive.”). 
 56 See 7 U.S.C. § 1902(a); Cassuto, supra note 28, at 4. 
 57 21 U.S.C. §§ 601–695 (2012). 
 58 Id. The FMIA allows animals who, after arrival at the slaughterhouse, are seriously injured 
to be butchered and sold for human consumption. Cassuto, supra note 28, at 6. Therefore, there is 
“little disincentive for industrial meat producers and their transporters to invest in the animals’ 
wellbeing.” Id. 
 59 Cassuto, supra note 28, at 6; Matheny & Leahy, supra note 5, at 327–29, 346 tbl.3. 
 60 See 21 U.S.C. § 678; Nat’l Meat Ass’n v. Harris, 132 S. Ct. 965, 968, 970–71 (2012) (hold-
ing that the FMIA explicitly prohibits state-imposed animal handling requirements that are “in 
addition to, or different than those made under this [Act]”). 
 61 See Nat’l Meat Ass’n, 132 S. Ct. at 968; Cassuto, supra note 28, at 3–4. 
 62 See 49 U.S.C. § 80502 (2012). 
10 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 43:1 
secutive hours have at least five hours of rest as well as food and water.63 
This law—which also excludes birds—fails in its application.64 Not only do 
the regulations allow birds to be confined indefinitely,65 but the law’s very 
title reveals a marked indifference to all other animals’ well-being. If non-
avian animals cannot be confined for more than twenty-eight hours, that 
means that they can be confined for up to twenty-eight hours without food, 
water, or space to move.66 Clearly, a law permitting such treatment has very 
little to do with actually safeguarding animal welfare.67 
In addition, as with the HMSA, the Twenty-Eight Hour Law is riddled 
with exemptions.68 For example, “Sheep may be confined an additional 
eight consecutive hours without being unloaded when the twenty-eight-hour 
period of confinement ends at night.”69 Because the owner has a vested in-
terest in the animals reaching market as soon as possible, there is a clear 
incentive to ignore the animals’ comfort in favor of speeding up their 
transport. Moreover, even putting aside its exemptions, the Twenty-Eight 
Hour Law is ineffective in practice because it is rarely enforced.70 The last 
known enforcement action dates back to 1960.71 Finally, even if the law 
were properly enforced (or enforced at all), its maximum penalty is $500 
per shipment.72 Offenders could easily absorb such fines as the cost of do-
ing business.73 
2. State Laws 
State laws offer little more protection than the federal statutes.74 While 
all states in the United States have anti-cruelty laws, agricultural animals 
remain largely unprotected because they are explicitly exempted from the 
                                                                                                                           
 63 Id.; see also Leahy, supra note 45, at 76. 
 64 See 9 C.F.R. § 89.1 (2015) (defining requirements under the Twenty Eight Hour Law; 
omitting categories for treatment for birds); see also Matheny & Leahy, supra note 5, at 335. 
 65 See 9 C.F.R. § 89.1. Because the regulations do not apply to birds, holding birds for a peri-
od longer than twenty-eight hours will not violate the law. See id. 
 66 See generally, 49 U.S.C. § 80502. 
 67 Cassuto, supra note 28, at 7–8. 
 68 See 49 U.S.C. § 80502(a)(2). 
 69 Id. 
 70 See Matheny & Leahy, supra note 5, at 334–36. 
 71 See 49 U.S.C. § 80502(a)(2); S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Comm’r, 75 T.C. 497, 502, 643, 654 
(1980) (referencing Twenty Eight Hour Act violations committed in 1960 and 1961); Matheny & 
Leahy, supra note 5, at 335; see also Cassuto & Saville, supra note 8, at 199. 
 72 See 49 U.S.C. § 80502(d) (providing for a civil penalty of “at least $100 but not more than 
$500 for each violation”). 
 73 Cassuto, supra note 28, at 8; see also Robyn Mallon, The Deplorable Standard of Living 
Faced by Farm Animals in America’s Meat Industry and How to Improve Conditions by Eliminat-
ing the Corporate Farm, 9 MICH. ST. UNIV. J. MED. & L. 389, 399 (2005). 
 74 See infra notes 75–122 and accompanying text. 
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laws’ respective ambits.75 The statutes are drafted in such a way as to make 
common (and cruel) agricultural practices acceptable, make enforcing the 
law impracticable, and render offenders immune from prosecution.76 
Traditionally, domestic animals were viewed as property to be used as 
the owner saw fit.77 However, when animals gained economic value, they 
acquired some limited legal protections, as well.78 Today, that relationship is 
inverted. Animals that were historically unprotected, such as domestic pets, 
have more legal protection than commoditized animals.79 Companion ani-
mals enjoy more protection than other animals because of their special rela-
tionship with humans.80 Farm animals, on the other hand, are generally ex-
empted from anti-cruelty laws because they are viewed as an instrument of 
production and a means to human ends. The laws are predicated on the no-
tion that “it would harm a human being to observe or [have] knowledge [of] 
the infliction of harm on a companion animal, while it may not harm them 
if pain were inflicted on an animal they solely use as a means to an end.”81 
This attitude underlies a commonly held notion that anti-cruelty laws are 
less concerned with protecting animals than with the morality and well-
                                                                                                                           
 75 See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 47-1-40(C) (2015) (providing that the statute does not apply to 
fowl and “accepted animal husbandry practices of farm operations”). 
 76 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-201.5 (2015) (stating that the act shall not affect accepted 
husbandry practices); IDAHO CODE § 25-3514(5) (2015) (providing that the statute shall not inter-
fere with normal or accepted practices of animal husbandry); MO. REV. STAT. § 578.007(8) (2015) 
(stating that the act shall not apply to “normal or accepted practices of animal husbandry”); see 
also Wolfson, supra note 2, at 123 (explaining that twenty-eight states have enacted laws that 
create a legal realm whereby certain acts, no matter how cruel, are outside the reach of anti-cruelty 
statutes as long as the acts are deemed “accepted,” “common,” “customary,” or “normal” farming 
practices). See generally Christopher A. Pierce, Detailed Discussion of Humane Societies and 
Enforcement Powers, MICH. ST. U. ANIMAL LEGAL & HISTORICAL CTR. (2011), https://www.animal
law.info/article/detailed-discussion-humane-societies-and-enforcement-powers [http://perma.cc/
93VW-34VV] (describing how some states delegate enforcement authority to humane societies 
because of difficulties in traditional enforcement). 
 77 Wolfson, supra note 2, at 127 (owners of domesticated animals were free to treat animals 
as they wished and dispose of them as they wished). 
 78 DAVID FAVRE & MURRAY LORING, ANIMAL LAW 122 (1983) (explaining how domesticat-
ed animals that were valuable in economic terms gained statutory protections against their theft 
and destruction); Wolfson, supra note 2, at 127 (“Only when animals gained economic value did 
the law prohibit the interference with such animals by someone other than the owner.”). 
 79 FAVRE & LORING, supra note 78, at 122; Wolfson, supra note 2, at 127. 
 80 Paige M. Tomaselli, Detailed Discussion of International Comparative Animal Cruelty Laws, 
MICH. ST. U. ANIMAL LEGAL & HISTORICAL CTR. (2003), https://www.animallaw.info/article/
detailed-discussion-international-comparative-animal-cruelty-laws [http://perma.cc/XTJ6-RXAT]. 
 81 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
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being of humans.82 The idea that humans form the focus of anti-cruelty laws 
has found its way into the jurisprudence, as well.83 
a. Statutory Construction 
As noted, many states explicitly exempt agricultural animals from cru-
elty protections. Thirty-seven states exempt “common” or “normal” farming 
practices from legal scrutiny.84 Thus, no matter how cruel a practice might 
be, if commonly done, it becomes legally permissible.85 Other states, like 
Iowa and Utah, exclude livestock from the statutory definition of “animal,” 
leaving them with virtually no protection at all.86 
Allowing the regulated community to base what is and is not permissi-
ble on industry practice goes beyond self-regulation; it points to a regulato-
ry matrix devoid of any real function.87 In this void, the commonality of a 
practice, rather than any normative analysis, becomes the barometer of ac-
ceptability. Commentators David Wolfson and Mariann Sullivan liken this 
approach to the fox guarding the henhouse.88 Professor J.B. Ruhl—referring 
to a similar indifference to the industry’s environmental impacts—calls it 
“the vast ‘anti-law’ of farms and the environment.”89 
                                                                                                                           
 82 See id. 
 83 See People v. Garcia, 812 N.Y.S.2d 66, 73 (2006) (concluding that killing goldfish in front 
of a small child amounts to aggravated cruelty because of the distress caused to the child); Chiesa, 
supra note 33, at 1. 
 84 Cody Carlson, How State Ag-Gag Laws Could Stop Animal-Cruelty Whistleblowers, AT-
LANTIC (Mar. 25, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/03/how-state-ag-gag-
laws-could-stop-animal-cruelty-whistleblowers/273962/ [http://perma.cc/3LT5-BYVK]. 
 85 See Wolfson, supra note 2, at 136. 
 86 IOWA CODE § 717B.1(1)(a) (2015) (stating that “‘animal’ does not include . . . [l]ivestock”); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-301(1)(b)(ii) (West 2015) (stating that “‘[a]nimal’ does not include . . . 
[l]ivestock”). 
 87 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-201.5 (2015) (“Nothing in this part . . . shall affect accepted 
animal husbandry practices . . . .”); IDAHO CODE § 25-3514 (2015) (“No part of this chapter shall 
be construed as interfering with . . . [n]ormal or accepted practices of animal identification and 
animal husbandry as established by, but not limited to, guidelines developed and approved by the 
appropriate national or state commodity organizations . . . .”); 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/13 (2015) 
(“Nothing in this Act affects normal, good husbandry practices utilized by any person in the pro-
duction of food, companion or work animals . . . .”); IOWA CODE § 717.2(1) (livestock neglect 
does not include conduct consistent with “customary animal husbandry practices”); MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 45-8-211(4) (2015) (“This section does not prohibit . . . the use of commonly accepted 
agricultural and livestock practices on livestock . . . .”); NEV. REV. STAT. § 574.200 (2015) 
(“The[se] provisions . . . do not . . . [p]rohibit or interfere with established methods of animal 
husbandry, including the raising, handling, feeding, housing and transporting of livestock or farm 
animals.”); see also Wolfson, supra note 2, at 127–32; Wolfson & Sullivan, supra note 6, at 207. 
 88 Wolfson & Sullivan, supra note 6, at 207. 
 89 J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
263, 267 (2000). 
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Another way states limit protections for agricultural animals is through 
a seemingly deliberate lack of clarity in defining the nature of any purported 
offense.90 Poor draftsmanship and vague terminology leave courts with 
broad discretion to determine if and how farm animals fall within the law’s 
scope.91 In addition, even statutes that cover agricultural animals frequently 
exclude requirements regarding their basic needs.92 These omissions in-
clude minimum requirements for adequate exercise, space, light, ventila-
tion, and clean living conditions.93 
b. Enforcement 
Aside from the myriad of exemptions and exclusions embedded in 
state laws, practical enforcement issues further hinder farm animal protec-
tions.94 For example, if a statute has a mens rea requirement and an indus-
trial facility houses hundreds of thousands of animals, it becomes very dif-
ficult to prove that the neglect and consequent suffering of specific animals 
in the facility was deliberate rather than the result of ignorance or simple 
negligence.95 Furthermore, resources for prosecuting crimes against animals 
often disappear in the face of relentless pressure to prioritize crimes against 
human victims.96 This budget squeeze presents additional difficulties be-
                                                                                                                           
 90 Wolfson & Sullivan, supra note 6, at 207–14. 
 91 Wolfson, supra note 2, at 131; see, e.g., State v. Stockton, 333 P.2d 735, 737 (Ariz. 1958) 
(“Our conclusion is that the legislature did not express an intention to include birds or fowls with-
in . . . the term ‘an animal.’”); State v. Buford, 331 P.2d 1110, 1115 (N.M. 1958) (“The language 
of the statute, however, seems to apply only to brute creatures and work animals.”); Lock v. 
Falkenstine, 380 P.2d 278, 283 (Okla. Crim. App. 1963) (“[T]he Oklahoma Statute makes no 
attempt to define animals, yet the legislature has described the species that come under certain 
provisions; and the Court is at a loss to ascertain why that was not done in the Statute before us.”). 
 92 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 382 (2015) (transportation statute allowing transport without 
food, water, and rest for up to eighteen hours); WIS. STAT. § 951.14 (2013–2014) (requiring provi-
sion of proper shelter, but does not require provisions any more stringent than normally accepted 
husbandry practices). Light is only a requirement in a few state statutes, and only Maine and Wis-
consin refer to clean living conditions in their statutes. ANIMAL WELFARE INST., ANIMALS AND 
THEIR LEGAL RIGHTS: A SUMMARY OF AMERICAN LAWS FROM 1641–1990, at 10 (1990) (citing 
ME. STAT. tit. 7, § 4011 (2015)). 
 93 Wolfson, supra note 2, at 131 (citing ANIMAL WELFARE INST., supra note 92, at 10); ME. 
STAT. tit. 7, § 4011 (describing how in Maine, it is unlawful to “[d]eprive an animal that the per-
son owns or possesses of necessary sustenance, necessary medical attention, proper shelter, pro-
tection from the weather or humanely clean conditions”). 
 94 See infra notes 95–106 and accompanying text. 
 95 See Wolfson, supra note 2, at 131 (noting that “many state statutes require that the prosecu-
tion demonstrate a mental state of the defendant that may be hard to prove”). 
 96 Id. (citing and quoting Steven Wise, Of Farm Animals and Justice, 3 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 
191, 206 (1986)) (‘“[T]he enforcement of these criminal statutes is typically left to a public prose-
cutorial agency, itself overwhelmed by human problems, or to an overburdened private Society for 
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cause state anti-cruelty laws provide no standing for private parties.97 Thus, 
if the state declines to prosecute a violation, there is no other recourse. 
Moreover, even if a state were to enforce its anti-cruelty policies, po-
lice officers may lack the training and expertise to identify crimes and en-
force the laws.98 Several states delegate police powers to humane societies 
and their agents.99 For example, in New York, the American Society for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals has broad authority to investigate and en-
force animal cruelty violations.100 Sometimes, delegation of enforcement 
authority involves specialized individuals endorsed by humane societies 
who work alongside police officers.101 On the other end of the spectrum, 
humane society agents may be granted all enforcement authority, essentially 
resulting in the deputization of humane society employees.102 Relegating 
animal protection to the purview of non-governmental organizations un-
dermines the status of the endeavor and leaves it to the mercy of privately 
funded organizations.103 
It also bears mentioning that because farming practices largely take 
place on private property, law enforcement is hindered because of the diffi-
culty of establishing the required probable cause to enter the premises 
where the alleged violation is taking place.104 Attaining probable cause of-
ten requires having a person on the inside documenting the criminal activi-
                                                                                                                           
the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (SPCA) or similar society, with no private enforcement 
right.’”). 
 97 See generally William A. Reppy, Jr., Citizen Standing to Enforce Anti-Cruelty Laws by 
Obtaining Injunctions: The North Carolina Experience, 11 ANIMAL L. 39 (2005) (describing how 
North Carolina is the only state that authorizes citizen standing for the enforcement of anti-cruelty 
laws); Kristen Stuber Snyder, Note, No Cracks in the Wall: The Standing Barrier and the Need for 
Restructuring Animal Protection Laws, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 137 (2009) (discussing the difficul-
ties of establishing standing in animal welfare cases). 
 98 See Pierce, supra note 76. See generally Resources for Law Enforcement, HUMANE SOC’Y 
OF THE U.S., http://www.humanesociety.org/issues/abuse_neglect/resources_law_enforcement.html 
[http://perma.cc/NJ72-E9D7] (discussing that law enforcement agencies across the country call 
upon the Animal Rescue Team to assist with the investigation and prosecution of animal abuse). 
 99 Pierce, supra note 76. 
 100 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 2.10(7) (McKinney 2015). 
 101 See Pierce, supra note 76. 
 102 Id. (detailing how California approves humane officers, giving them nearly all the powers 
of a police officer, and may allow them to carry a firearm). 
 103 Wolfson, supra note 2, at 147 (“The delegation of power to the farming industry is breath-
taking. It is difficult to imagine another non-governmental group possessing such influence over a 
criminal legal definition. In effect, state legislators have granted agribusiness a ‘legal license’ to 
treat farm animals as they wish.”). 
 104 Id. at 132 (“It is . . . extremely difficult to ascertain what occurs on the average farm, be-
cause a farm is private property.”). 
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ty.105 Yet, many states have criminalized the undercover operations that ex-
pose the animal abuse.106 
c. State Level Ag-Gag Legislation 
Ag-gag laws “criminalize the recordings, possession, or distribution of 
still images (photos), live images (video) and/or audio at or upon a farm, 
industrial agricultural operation, or animal facility.”107 In the 1980s, the 
predecessors of ag-gag laws sought to prevent theft or injury to farmed an-
imals.108 However, in their contemporary form, these laws now prohibit the 
production of unauthorized audio/visual recordings at agricultural facilities 
and the possession and distribution of recordings.109 
While proponents of ag-gag legislation claim that such laws are neces-
sary for the protection of agricultural enterprises against defamation and 
misrepresentation, numerous organizations with focuses ranging from civil 
liberties, public health, food safety, environmental, food justice, animal wel-
fare, legal, workers’ rights, to free speech oppose ag-gag laws as a violation 
of the First Amendment.110 Ultimately, such laws bolster the ability of the 
agricultural industry to keep inhumane practices behind closed doors, free 
from the threat of prosecution or public opprobrium.111 
Existing laws such as trespass already criminalize much of the behav-
ior criminalized by ag-gag laws.112 However, ag-gag laws drastically in-
                                                                                                                           
 105 Id. (citing State v. Osborn, 409 N.E.2d 1077 (Ohio 1980)). 
 106 See id. (pointing to the significant trend within states to remove legal protection from ani-
mals raised for food or food production altogether). 
 107 ABIGAIL PERDUE & RANDALL LOCKWOOD, ANIMAL CRUELTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH: 
WHEN WORLDS COLLIDE 232 (2014). 
 108 Sonci Kingery, Note, The Agricultural Iron Curtain: Ag Gag Legislation and the Threat to 
Free Speech, Food Safety, and Animal Welfare, 17 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 645, 656 (2012) (stating 
that “the Kansas law was less focused on undercover investigations and more concerned with 
property damage and liberation or theft of animals”). 
 109 See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 717A.3A (2015); MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-30-103(2)(e) (2015); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-112(2)(a)–(d) (West 2015). 
 110 See Kathleen Masterson, Ag-Gag Law Blows Animal Activists’ Cover, NPR (Mar. 10, 
2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/03/10/148363509/ag-gag-law-blows-animal-activists-cover [http://
perma.cc/T3G6-6883] (explaining how ag-gag laws can silence workers who see abuse and film 
it, and in turn, infringe upon their right to free speech). See generally Kevin C. Adam, Note, 
Shooting the Messenger: A Common-Sense Analysis of State “Ag-Gag” Legislation Under the 
First Amendment, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1129 (2012) (discussing the inherent conflict between 
ag-gag laws and First Amendment rights). 
 111 Mark Bittman, Who Protects the Animals?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2011 9:29 PM), http://
www.opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/26/who-protects-the-animals [http://perma.cc/CZ6C-
JLPN]. 
 112 Trespass, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining trespass as “[a]n unlawful 
act committed against the . . . property of another” or “wrongful entry on another’s real property”). 
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crease the severity of the penalties for such violations, based solely on the 
media’s content and the actor’s intent.113 As such, they raise serious consti-
tutional questions.114 A number of governors have vetoed ag-gag legislation 
and several others are facing court challenges.115 
Ag-gag laws also present an interesting irony similar to the inversion 
of necessity in animal cruelty laws. Just as animal cruelty laws define ne-
cessity in terms of the needs of the person inflicting the cruelty, ag-gag laws 
are designed to protect those who inflict cruelty, while criminalizing those 
who expose it.116 Thus, victimized animals are completely ignored by the 
legal system while those who victimize them receive the extensive protec-
tion. Under Idaho’s recently overturned ag-gag statute, for example, viola-
tions could have led to up to a year in jail and a $5,000 fine.117 Yet, the 
maximum jail time for a first violation of the state’s animal cruelty statute 
was six months.118 Thus, the law would have “punish[ed] those who expose 
animal cruelty more severely than those who actually commit[ed] it.”119 
In sum, agricultural animals in the United States have almost no legal 
protection from birth to slaughter.120 Given this reality, the question be-
comes whether improved legislation would cure existing deficiencies and 
provide adequate safeguards against inhumane agricultural practices. As the 
ensuing discussion of Brazil’s legal regime makes clear, even impressive 
                                                                                                                           
 113 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1827(c) (2014); MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-30-103. 
 114 See Adam, supra note 110, at 1169 (discussing how ag-gag laws are likely an unconstitu-
tional content-based restriction on speech). 
 115 See, e.g., Civil Rights Complaint at 2, Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Herbert, No. 13-679 (D. 
Utah filed July 22, 2013), http://www.mediapeta.com/peta/pdf/PETAALDFUtahAgGag
Complaint.pdf [http://perma.cc/8SVC-CHM2] (challenging Utah’s ag-gag law as unconstitutional, 
claiming that it violates the Supremacy Clause and First and Fourteenth Amendments); Jessalee 
Landfried, Note, Bound & Gagged: Potential First Amendment Challenges to “Ag-Gag” Laws, 23 
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 377, 391–401 (2013) (pointing out weaknesses in First Amendment 
challenges to existing and proposed ag-gag laws); Samantha Lachman, North Carolina Gov. Pat 
McCrory Defies GOP Legislature, Vetoes ‘Ag-Gag’ Bill, HUFFINGTON POST (May 29, 2015, 3:51 
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/05/29/pat-mccrory-ag-gag-_n_7471210.html [http://
perma.cc/5M7E-BEUS] (North Carolina Governor Pat McCrory vetoing ag-gag bill over concerns 
that it could criminalize employees who report illegal activity); Andy Sher, Tennessee Governor Bill 
Haslam Vetoing ‘Ag-gag’ Bill, TIMES FREE PRESS (May 13, 2013), http://www.timesfreepress.
com/news/local/story/2013/may/13/tennessee-governor-bill-haslam-vetoing-ag-gag-bill/107867/ 
[http://perma.cc/29L8-SAZT] (Tennessee Governor Bill Haslam vetoing ag-gag bill, citing First 
Amendment concerns). 
 116 See Landfried, supra note 115, at 391. 
 117 See IDAHO CODE § 18-7042(1) (2015); Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, No. 14-104, 
2015 WL 4623943, at *3 (D. Idaho Aug. 3, 2015). 
 118 See IDAHO CODE § 25-3520A(1). 
 119 Civil Rights Complaint at ¶ 50, Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, 44 F. Supp. 3d 1009 (D. 
Idaho 2014) (No. 14-104), 2014 WL 1017045, at *1. 
 120 See supra notes 41–119 and accompanying text. 
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legislation coupled with constitutional rights cannot overcome countervail-
ing economic and social forces.121 Therefore, more than simply stronger 
laws are needed; the entire regulatory regime needs to be reformed.122 
B. Regulation in Brazil 
Brazil’s animal welfare regime dates to 1924, when the federal gov-
ernment enacted Decree 16.560/1924, prohibiting the “carrying out of any 
behavior or recreation that cause[s] suffering to animals.”123 A decade later, 
in 1934, then President Getulio Vargas promulgated Decree 24.645, which 
prohibited: 
[Maintaining] animals in anti-hygienic places or where they can-
not breath properly, move or rest, or are deprived of light; . . . 
abandon[ing] [an] animal that is ill, hurt, worn out or mutilated, 
and also not giving to it everything that is possible, including vet-
erinary assistance; . . . [or] not giving quickly death, without long 
suffering, for an animal for which extermination is necessary for 
consumption or not . . . .124 
The law also enabled lawyers from the Public Ministry, or attorneys from 
animal protection organizations to assist animals in court.125 This gives an-
imals a form of standing in federal court that is wholly lacking in the United 
States.126 The Public Ministry or Public Prosecutor’s Office is considered a 
fourth branch of the Brazilian government.127 Completely autonomous and 
separate from the legislative, judicial, and executive branches, its sole pur-
pose is to oversee compliance with the law and defend national interests.128 
                                                                                                                           
 121 See infra notes 123–178 and accompanying text. 
 122 See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 123 Decreto No. 16.560, de 16 de Agosto de 1924, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 
16.8.1924 (Braz.); Silva, supra note 11, at 83. 
 124 Brazil Federal Decree on Anti-Cruelty No. 24,645, MICH. ST. U. ANIMAL LEGAL & 
HISTORICAL CTR., https://www.animallaw.info/administrative/br-federal-decree-anti-cruelty [http://
perma.cc/4VZS-T3P4] (providing a summary, in English, of Decree 25.645); see Decreto No. 
24.645, de 10 de Julho de 1934, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 10.07.1934 (Braz.); 
Cassuto & Saville, supra note 8, at 202. 
 125 Decreto No. 25.645, de 10 de Julho de 1934, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 
10.07.1934 (Braz.). 
 126 Silva, supra note 11, at 83. 
 127 Lesley McAllister & Benjamin van Rooij, Environmental Challenges in Middle-Income 
Countries: A Comparison of Enforcement in Brazil, China, Indonesia, and Mexico, in LAW AND 
DEVELOPMENT OF MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES: AVOIDING THE MIDDLE-INCOME TRAP 288, 
288–306 (Randall Peerenboom & Tom Ginsberg eds., 2014). 
 128 Learn More About the Public Ministry of Brazil, PORTAL BRAZ., http://translate.google.com/
translate?sl=auto&tl=en&js=n&prev=_t&hl=en&ie=UTF-8&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.brasil.gov.
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One of the most significant legal developments involving animal pro-
tection in Brazil (or anywhere) was the enactment of the Brazilian Constitu-
tion of 1988, which explicitly recognizes fundamental rights for animals.129 
Article 225 states that: 
All [people] have the right to an ecologically balanced environ-
ment, which is an asset of common use and essential to a healthy 
quality of life, and both the Government and the community shall 
have the duty to defend and preserve it for present and future 
generations. 
Paragraph 1—In order to ensure the effectiveness of this right, it is 
incumbent upon the Government to . . . protect the fauna and the 
flora, with prohibition, in the manner prescribed by law, of all 
practices which represent a risk to their ecological function, cause 
the extinction of a species or subject an animal to cruelty.130 
Since the Constitution’s enactment, animal protection laws have gained 
broader acceptance.131 One important milestone was the 1998 enactment of 
Article 32 of the Environmental Criminal Act (the “Act”), criminalizing 
abuse, mistreatment, injury, and mutilation of domestic animals.132 Violat-
ing this act can result in fines and/or imprisonment ranging from three 
months to one year.133 
Even if the animal’s suffering was inflicted for a scientific or educa-
tional purpose, perpetrators may still be liable if they failed to seek out al-
ternative approaches.134 However, as with U.S. anti-cruelty laws, Brazil’s 
Environmental Criminal Act does not protect agricultural animals.135 For 
                                                                                                                           
br%2Fgoverno%2F2010%2F01%2Fministerio-publico&act=ur [https://perma.cc/VZR5-N54P] (last 
updated July 28, 2014). 
 129 E. BRADFORD BURNS, A HISTORY OF BRAZIL 500 (1994) (stating that the 1988 Constitu-
tion was the fifth constitution since Brazil gained independence from Portugal in 1822, and was 
the first since Brazil became a democracy following the end of the military dictatorship in 1985). 
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2016] Don’t Be Cruel (Anymore) 19 
example, Article 37 of the Act, entitled “Crimes against Fauna,” appears to 
cover wild and domesticated animals.136 Yet, the provision addressing 
slaughter only provides for the legality of killing wild animals and hunting 
for subsistence purposes—i.e., when it is carried out to satisfy a necessity of 
hunger.137 Omitting agricultural animals from this provision leaves them in 
a legal limbo. While the legislature did not intend to outlaw the commercial 
slaughter of animals, the extent to which it meant to regulate the practice 
remains unclear.138 
Beyond general statutes prohibiting cruelty, Brazil, like the United 
States, also has rules and guidance governing animal treatment during and 
resulting from transport.139 The Regulation of Industrial and Health Inspec-
tion of Products of Origin Act (2005) states that “animals must remain at 
the lairage for rest and fasting for 24 hours.”140 This requirement provides a 
mandatory resting period in special resting pens before slaughter.141 This 
lairage requirement period can be reduced depending on the distance the 
animal has traveled.142 Moreover, like the United States, Brazil also ex-
cludes birds from laws governing transport or export that affect the welfare 
of the animal.143 However, unlike the United States, Brazil’s humane 
slaughter laws do apply to birds in addition to mammals.144 Whether these 
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humane standards, on a practical level, are imputed into export and transport 
legislation remains an open question.145 
The Brazilian government has also worked with the agricultural indus-
try to implement what it terms “Good Agricultural Practices.”146 This pro-
gram was developed by the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation to 
implement recommended standards for “vegetables, maize, soybeans, man-
goes, melons, beef, milk, swine and broiler production.”147 Specifically, the 
program propounds general guidelines for cattle welfare.148 Yet, as is evi-
dent from the linking of animals and vegetables, the emphasis lies on the 
quality of the eventual food rather than the animals’ wellbeing. The focus 
remains always on the food.149 
Brazil’s Good Agricultural Practice standards are worth comparing to 
those of the European Union (“EU”).150 The most significant difference is 
that in Brazil, the decision to adopt the Good Agricultural Practice standards 
is voluntary, not mandatory.151 EU guidelines include a comprehensive ap-
proach predicated on the understanding that animals are “sentient beings” 
and should be treated in such a way that they do not suffer unnecessarily.152 
All EU animal welfare directives emphasize the Five Freedoms: 
 1.  Freedom from hunger and thirst—access to fresh water and a diet 
for full health and vigor; 
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 2.  Freedom from discomfort—an appropriate environment with shel-
ter and comfortable rest areas; 
 3.  Freedom from pain, injury and disease—prevention or rapid 
treatment; 
 4.  Freedom to express normal behavior—adequate space and facili-
ties, company of the animal’s own kind; 
 5.  Freedom from fear and distress—conditions and treatment which 
avoid mental suffering.153 
In 1998, the EU enacted welfare legislation for agricultural animals to 
ensure that “owners or keepers take all reasonable steps to ensure the wel-
fare of animals under their care and to ensure that those animals are not 
caused any unnecessary pain, suffering or injury.”154 The directive enumer-
ates specific requirements including freedom of movement, air circulation, 
adequate lighting, and appropriate food and water supplies.155 
In 2009, the EU also mandated that “[n]o person shall transport ani-
mals or cause animals to be transported in a way likely to cause injury or 
undue suffering to them.”156 Finally, EU standards for slaughter aim to 
avoid pain and minimize the stress and suffering endured by farm animals 
during the process.157 The regulation heightened operator responsibilities, 
imposed stricter standards, and increased training and research.158 These 
standards are mandatory in all EU member countries.159 
Though Brazil’s Good Agricultural Practices conform with or exceed 
EU animal welfare standards and while many Brazilian producers partici-
pate, the Brazilian guidelines are voluntary.160 Consequently, inhumane 
treatment remains entrenched throughout the industry.161 In an effort to ad-
dress these and other animal welfare issues, the Brazilian Ministry of Agri-
culture, Livestock and Food Supply established the Permanent Technical 
Commission on Animal Welfare (“MAPA”).162 
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Among other responsibilities, MAPA’s portfolio requires that it: 
[D]evelop and propose legislation, standards and technical rec-
ommendations of good practices for Animal Welfare; encourage 
and promote events related to the Commission’s target topic; 
promote training of all involved in the livestock chain; articulate 
with representative entities of the livestock and research sectors; 
propose publication and dissemination of technical material and 
information on animal welfare [and] encourage and propose 
agreements, covenants and terms of cooperation with public and 
private entities to promote actions linked to Animal Welfare.163 
Additionally, MAPA collaborated with the World Society for the Protection 
of Animals (“WSPA”) to initiate the “Steps” program.164 Steps is concerned 
with “theoretical and on-site training on pre-slaughter and humane slaughter 
practices.”165 The WSPA contracted with MAPA to provide veterinarians in 
Brazil with training in animal welfare standards.166 Lastly, MAPA officially 
acknowledged the Brazilian Poultry Union’s voluntary animal welfare pro-
tocol for broiler chickens and turkeys.167 As in the United States, chickens 
and turkeys make up a very high percentage of agricultural animals in Bra-
zil.168 Thus, having some protections in place for them is highly significant. 
While MAPA’s acknowledgement and collaboration with the WSPA do not 
create actual legal protections for animals, they nonetheless support animal 
welfare goals and complement currently available regulatory and legal 
measures.169 
Amidst these existing regulations and voluntary standards, Brazilian 
agricultural animals continue to endure hardships over and above those in-
herent to the meat and dairy industries.170 For example, in the last decade, 
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Brazil’s live export industry—already massive—has surged.171 Live export 
involves transporting living animals to other countries for slaughter.172 Bra-
zil exports approximately 480,000 cattle per year, primarily to Venezuela 
and Lebanon.173 Though Brazil boasts of the quality of its “green” cattle, 
the exportation process involves a long journey, often by truck and boat dur-
ing which the animals are crammed into very small spaces, often without 
access to food or water.174 All steps of the process create traumatic, stress-
ful, and unhealthy conditions that lead to terrible suffering and high mortali-
ty.175 As a result, and even assuming the animals were well-treated prior to 
beginning their final journey, the next phase of their short lives is well be-
yond what most would consider humane or even endurable.176 In sum, the 
protections afforded to agricultural animals in Brazil are insufficient, just as 
they are in the United States.177 And, as the industry continues to grow, the 
number of animals and quantum of mistreatment will necessarily grow, as 
well.178 
II. EXEMPTING AGRICULTURAL ANIMALS FROM ANTI-CRUELTY 
PROTECTION EXACERBATES THE PROBLEM 
The foregoing discussion identified laws and practices currently in 
place that address animal welfare in both the United States and Brazil.179 
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While the United States provides agricultural animals with fewer statutory 
and regulatory protections, widespread mistreatment is the norm in both 
countries.180 Unfortunately, in both the United States and Brazil, the reach 
of cruelty protections is quite narrow, effectively applying only to house 
pets.181 Because pets comprise a miniscule percentage of animals in human 
society, cruelty laws as written and applied offer very little animal protec-
tion at all.182 Indeed, as David Wolfson has observed, the number of animals 
protected by law as compared to those who have no protection at all is so 
small that animal law as such effectively does not exist.183 This section ex-
amines the animal cruelty that arises from the “common” practices of indus-
trial farms in both nations despite their respective legal and regulatory re-
gimes and alleged commitment to animal welfare.184 
Most agricultural animals: 
[N]ever experience sunshine, grass, trees, fresh air, unfettered 
movement, sex, or many other things that make up most of what 
we think of as the ordinary pattern of life on earth. They are cas-
trated without anesthesia, on occasion deliberately starved, live in 
conditions of extreme and unrelieved crowding, and suffer physi-
cal deformities as a result of genetic manipulation.185 
For example, Smithfield Foods, the largest pork producer in the world, pro-
duces six billion pounds of pig meat annually by confining the animals “by 
the hundreds or thousands in warehouse-like barns, in rows of wall-to-wall 
pens . . . . Forty fully grown 250-pound male hogs often occupy a pen the 
size of a tiny apartment . . . . There is no sunlight, straw, fresh air, or 
earth.”186 Though Smithfield Foods committed to a phase-out program for 
gestation crates in 2009 and 2011, as of January 2014 the crates remained in 
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use in almost half of the company’s facilities and in many of the independ-
ent facilities with which Smithfield contracts for pork.187 
Gestation crates are cages that confine sows to a space so small that 
they cannot even turn around.188 The pigs languish in these crates for 
years.189 In addition to the obvious and ongoing discomfort they create, ges-
tation crates cause an “elevated risk of urinary tract infections, weakened 
bones, lameness, behavioral restriction, and stereotypies.”190 Gestation 
crates are common in both Brazil and the United States, and are but one of 
countless examples of the mistreatment that forms the norm for billions of 
animals.191 
Confinement practices often result in animals getting trampled and 
starved, as well as causing lameness, leg and joint disorders, emotional dis-
tress, and other health problems.192 In the egg industry, male chicks are 
killed shortly after they are hatched (males add no value to the egg produc-
tion process).193 Females have their beaks cut off without anesthetic before 
getting confined to tiny battery cages where they endure unremitting dis-
comfort until becoming “spent” (unable to produce).194 They are then killed, 
                                                                                                                           
 187 See Clare Leschin-Hoar, Pork Farmers to Let Pregnant Pigs Out of Confinement Crates, 
TAKEPART (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.takepart.com/article/2014/01/09/beginning-end-gestation-
crates [http://perma.cc/CT27-722J]; Smithfield Foods Recommits to 2017 Phase-Out of Gestation 
Crates, HUMANE SOC’Y OF THE U.S. (Dec. 8, 2011), http://www.humanesociety.org/news/press_
releases/2011/12/smithfield_foods_recommits_12082011.html. 
 188 Crammed into Gestation Crates: Life for America’s Breeding Pigs, HUMANE SOC’Y OF 
THE U.S. (Feb. 19, 2014), http://humanesociety.org/issues/confinement_farm/facts/gestation_crates.
html. 
 189 Leahy, supra note 45, at 67. 
 190 HUMANE SOC’Y INT’L, AN HSI BRAZIL REPORT: THE WELFARE OF INTENSIVELY CON-
FINED ANIMALS IN BATTERY CAGES, GESTATION CRATES, AND VEAL CRATES 4 (n.d.) [hereinaf-
ter HSI BRAZIL REPORT], http://www.hsi.org/assets/pdfs/welfare-of-intensively-confined-animals-
brazil-sept-08.pdf [http://perma.cc/K2XK-9X3C]. 
 191 See WORLD SOC’Y FOR THE PROT. OF ANIMALS, ALTERNATIVAS PRÁTICAS Á PECUÁRIA 
INDUSTRIAL NA AMERICA LATINA 4–5 (2010), http://issuu.com/wspa_brasil/docs/alternativas_
praticas_a_pecuaria_industrial/9; A Closer Look at Animals on Factory Farms, ASPCA, https://
www.aspca.org/animal-cruelty/factory-farms/animals-factory-farms [perma.cc/9HGK-NY2V] (de-
scribing the agricultural norms for animal treatment throughout the beef cattle, dairy cattle, and 
veal industries in the United States); Humane Society International and Partners Deliver Petition 
Asking for Farm Animal Welfare Legislation, HUMANE SOC’Y INT’L (Mar. 21, 2012), http://www.
hsi.org/news/press_releases/2012/03/petition_032112.html (stating that in Brazil, “The majority of 
breeding sows (female pigs) are confined in individual metal gestation crates for nearly their entire 
lives, unable to even turn around”). 
 192 Stathopoulos, supra note 185, at 411–12. 
 193 See Sheila Rodriguez, The Morally Informed Consumer: Examining Animal Welfare Claims 
on Egg Labels, 30 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 51, 57 (2011). 
 194 See UNITED EGG PRODUCERS, UNITED EGG PRODUCERS ANIMAL HUSBANDRY GUIDELINES 
8 (2010), http://www.unitedegg.org/information/pdf/UEP_2010_Animal_Welfare_Guidelines.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/3CVP-FADV] (explaining that the purpose of beak trimming is to prevent cannibal-
ism, pecking, feather pulling, and fighting amongst birds, but that it causes difficulty eating and 
 
26 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 43:1 
often so carelessly that their deaths are slow and gruesome.195 Within the 
United States, 95–98% of eggs come from hens raised in these wire cages 
too small for the hens even to spread their wings.196 
In Brazil, “More than 90 percent of eggs are produced by birds who 
spend almost their entire lives confined in small battery cages in which each 
hen is given less space than a single sheet of letter-sized paper.”197 These 
cages prevent birds from nesting, dust-bathing, perching, scratching, freely 
walking, and a whole host of other natural behaviors.”198 Battery cages are 
stacked by the hundreds and thousands, and, in addition to causing the 
physical suffering mentioned above, they create psychological stresses that 
lead to cannibalism, emotional distress, and death.199 
Even when cruel practices are exposed and publicized, it causes little 
change in the animals’ treatment.200 The veal industry, for example, has re-
ceived a great deal of attention, but the confinement practices that caused 
the public outcry remain widespread.201 Veal calves are typically chained by 
their necks in stalls so small that they can barely move for their entire six-
teen-week lives.202 They are usually kept in the dark, and fed a nutrient-
deficient diet to keep them anemic.203 The resulting iron-deficiency means 
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that the calves’ flesh has the pale color that consumers have traditionally 
preferred.204 “Suckling” pigs endure a similarly short and miserable life.205 
The list of cruel practices continues and has been well documented 
elsewhere.206 In the pork industry, piglet’s tails are cut off, their ears are 
notched, and male pigs are castrated, all without anesthetic.207 Beef cattle 
must endure (among other things) dehorning, castration, and branding, also 
without any anesthetic.208 Because slaughter methods are either under-
regulated or unenforced in both countries, common methods of slaughter 
also cause significant suffering.209 The animals are often inadequately 
stunned and thus conscious as they get boiled and skinned alive.210 
Clearly, inhumane treatment is commonplace in both nations and 
shows no sign of abating.211 The next section offers an explanation describ-
ing the underlying forces that allow for and support common practices of 
agricultural animal mistreatment.212 
III. LACK OF PROTECTION AND CRUELTY TO AGRICULTURAL ANIMALS 
HAVE BECOME ENTRENCHED WITHIN THE UNITED STATES AND BRAZIL 
A. United States—Pressures and Political Tensions Leading to Lack of 
Protection Against Cruelty 
The agricultural lobby in the United States has historically wielded 
enormous power and influence on the legislative and regulatory processes, 
as well as on the imagination of the American public.213 Unfortunately, the 
reality of the agricultural industry has little in common with the popular 
imagination or the rhetoric of the political process. Within the agricultural 
industry animals are referred to as “‘food-producing units,’ ‘protein har-
vesters,’ ‘converting machines,’ ‘crops,’ ‘grain-consuming animal units’ (as 
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defined by the United States Department of Agriculture) and ‘biom-
achines.’”214 
The impact of these terms goes beyond the merely linguistic. It chang-
es the way animals and their needs are perceived.215 One can scarcely imag-
ine, for example, lobbying for stricter laws to protect a “protein harvester” 
or a “grain-consuming animal unit.”216 Indeed, the costs involved in pre-
serving the animals’ well-being are viewed as balance sheet net negatives to 
be reduced whenever possible.217 Relegating animals to mere components 
of an industrial process derogates their sentience and renders their well-
being an ancillary concern at best.218 At worst, the animals’ basic needs are 
perceived as costs to be reduced, liabilities the significance of which gets 
measured in dollars rather than by quotient of suffering.219 
Moreover, the U.S. government, prodded by the farm lobby, has creat-
ed “a legally protected sphere whereby any act, if it is viewed as customary 
by the United States farming community, is determined not to be cruel.”220 
Dating back to the post-WWII era: 
[T]he post-war economy allowed people to purchase more meat 
per capita, the percentage of Americans who were sustenance 
farmers dropped, and technological advances allowed industrial 
means to be applied to agricultural production, including inten-
sive confinement, mechanized treatment, and the beginnings of 
genetic manipulation of animals to increase their meat, egg, and 
milk output.221 
This economic climate fostered factory farming, and as industrial agricul-
ture grew, the industry gained stronger political power and consumers be-
came more accustomed to semantically obscuring their meat consumption 
by “labeling pig as pork bacon, or sausage; cow as beef or hamburger; 
sheep as mutton; calves as veal; and deer as venison.”222 The animal itself 
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was no longer foremost in the vocabulary of consumption and as a result, 
lost primacy in the consciousness of the consumer, as well.223 
The modern agricultural industry has enormous political power and 
uses the romantic rhetoric of the family farm to shield itself from regulation 
and critical scrutiny.224 Yet, the modern agricultural industry is completely 
different than the small family-run farms of eras past.225 Today, a few giant 
corporations dominate the industry.226 A 2012 study from the University of 
Missouri-Columbia found that “the four largest companies controlled 82 
percent of the beef packing industry, 85 percent of soybean processing, 63 
percent of pork packing, and 53 percent of broiler chicken processing.”227 
As one commenter points out, “[A]gribusiness concentration works in many 
ways, all with same objective: to move income from farmers and rural 
economies to Wall Street.”228 So, even as the industry appropriates the cul-
turally powerful rhetoric of the small farmer to lobby and advertise, its 
methods and policies actually drive small farmers out of business.229 
In the United States, the industry’s power is visible at every phase of 
the regulatory process.230 For example, the American Farm Bureau Federa-
tion successfully deterred Congress from passing a bill that would have re-
quired an eighteen-month delay before the merger of big agricultural com-
panies.231 The bill would have also required the formation of a Commission 
to examine market power and concentration in the agricultural industry.232 
The federal government has supported agribusiness for decades 
through price support programs, mandatory generic advertising campaigns, 
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the national school lunch program, and exemptions from environmental 
regulations.233 Federal policies also incentivize Confined Animal Feeding 
Operations (“CAFOs”) through tax breaks and subsidies for building feed-
lots.234 Furthermore, as the Agricultural Act of 2014 (“Farm Bill”) demon-
strates, even as deficit and price support programs have come under in-
creased scrutiny, support for the agricultural industry remains a priority.235 
Under the Farm Bill, the industry continues to receive (among other bene-
fits) subsidized crop insurance and subsidies for rice and peanut growers.236 
It barely merits mention that the law does not address animal welfare stand-
ards at all.237 
At the state level, statutory exemptions for “customary farming prac-
tices” that cause widespread animal suffering are common.238 Because “cus-
tomary” is determined by the agricultural industry, which profits from the 
practices, the interest of the agricultural animal is unprotected and ig-
nored.239 In the aggregate, state exemptions and a lack of federal protection 
have enabled the agricultural industry to determine for itself what protec-
tions should be afforded to the animals. Unsurprisingly, such protections are 
virtually nonexistent.240 
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B. Brazil—Pressures and Political Tensions Leading to Lack of  
Protection Against Cruelty 
Brazil’s agricultural lobby is similarly powerful as that of the United 
States, and its power continues to grow.241 Unlike the United States, the 
lobby in Brazil remains informal and difficult to monitor or track.242 Even 
as it has eschewed a formal organizational structure, the agribusiness lobby 
has gained an outsized voice on many legal, political, and economic deci-
sions.243 This has led to widespread subsidies, which have further bolstered 
the industry and increased its influence in a repeating cycle of empower-
ment and enrichment.244 As the power and influence of the agricultural in-
dustry has grown, concern for animal well-being has decreased.245 Given 
the bottom-line focus of the industry and the fact that animals are viewed as 
fungible with low replacement costs, this trend reflects the industry’s log-
ic.246 With consumption of animal products continuing to increase, the 
means by which the industry meets the ballooning global demand will inev-
itably result in more harm to more animals.247 
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Consumer backlash sometimes leads to reforms within the industry.248 
Yet, when reforms lead to increased costs, there is a marked drop-off in the 
public’s willingness to pressure the industry to change.249 Studies have 
shown that cost, rather than conscience, most often drives purchasing deci-
sions.250 
Brazil is home to large corporations that control a substantial portion 
of the agricultural market.251 This economic dominance allows these entities 
to exercise significant influence on policymaking.252 Also similar to the 
United States, Brazilian agricultural production has prospered at the ex-
pense of small farmers.253 As in other emerging economies, Brazil has con-
solidated production through vertical integration.254 In Brazil, four integra-
tors supply 40% of broiler chickens.255 In the dairy industry, the number of 
milk producers fell by 23% between 2000 and 2002 while the volume of 
milk production stayed the same.256 In the state of Santa Catarina alone, 
“20,000 families left the countryside in 1998, many leaving pig and poultry 
production because they could not compete with the big corporations.”257 
Similar trends are visible throughout the country, fueling the growth of in-
dustrial agriculture and fortifying its impact on policymaking.258 
Brazil’s regulatory process also faces the threat of agency capture.259 
As the largest meat exporter in the world, Brazil’s cattle herd exceeds 250 
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million animals.260 Nonetheless, and despite its recent emergence as a glob-
al economic power, Brazil remains in many respects a developing nation.261 
Its economy is fragile and its comparatively strong animal welfare standards 
exist in tension with its economic impulsion to generate the maximum 
amount of animal products at the lowest possible cost.262 Additionally, Per-
manent Technical Commission on Animal Welfare, the agency assigned to 
promote animal welfare within the agricultural industry, focuses instead on 
management strategies aimed at yielding the highest production and best 
quality of meat.263 Animal welfare is a secondary concern at best.264 
IV. SOLUTIONS TO PROMOTING THE WELL-BEING OF ANIMALS WITHIN THE 
AGRICULTURAL INDUSTRY 
The raw political power of the agricultural industry coupled with un-
discerning consumer demand has created a regulatory vacuum in the United 
States, as well as widespread exemptions and lack of enforcement in the 
United States and Brazil.265 Both countries allow an industry for which min-
imizing animal welfare maximizes profit, to determine the standards and 
methods for the animals’ treatment.266 Brazil has acknowledged the need to 
change this model but neither country has efficiently curbed rampant abuses 
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within the industry.267 Effective regulation and proper incentives to obey, 
coupled with additional incentives to monitor, form the baseline for a regu-
latory regime that is sensitive to animal welfare.268 
We suggest that the best way to create such a regime is through the 
formation of an independent regulatory agency devoted solely to animal 
welfare in both the United States and Brazil. Such an agency would owe no 
allegiance to the agricultural industry and would therefore be less vulnera-
ble to agency capture. The next sections describe how such an Animal Wel-
fare Agency would operate in the respective countries. 
A. Animal Welfare Agency in the United States 
An independent agency unaffiliated with or nested within any existing 
agency or cabinet-level department would alleviate the pressure from the 
agricultural lobby and the entrenchment of industry norms and end the con-
sistent privileging of economics over animal welfare. Independent agencies 
are not located directly within an executive department or within the execu-
tive branch. They are therefore insulated from political interests and pres-
sures that might otherwise influence their actions.269 These impartial agen-
cies are “charged with the enforcement of no policy except the policy of the 
law.”270 This impartiality and focused implementation of the law provides a 
useful foundation for addressing the systemic challenges of animal wel-
fare.271 The next sections describe how this agency, which we are tentative-
ly naming the Animal Welfare Agency (“AWA”), might look if created in 
the United States.272 
1. Structure to Ensure Independence 
Every agency is created by an enabling statute, which establishes the 
agency’s structure and purpose and delegates the necessary authority to ef-
fectuate that purpose.273 The enabling statute also includes the necessary 
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information to establish the institutional structure and level of independence 
of the agency.274 The Animal Welfare Agency would require a strong ena-
bling statute in order to effectively shift authority that has become well-
entrenched elsewhere and to clearly establish the agency’s independence.275 
Traditionally, independent agencies are structured as multi-member 
commissions with “for cause” removal protection.276 “For cause” removal is 
the most salient feature of American independent agencies, and is integral to 
the ability to function without presidential oversight and pressure.277 “For 
cause” means that the agency head (or any Commissioner) cannot be re-
moved at will.278 That means that officials may only be removed for “ineffi-
ciency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”279 Because independence 
is vital to the AWA, for cause removal must be part of the AWA’s enabling 
act.280 
Organizations structured in this manner “tend[] toward accommoda-
tion of diverse or extreme views through the compromise inherent in the 
process of collegial decision-making,” thus leading to less politically biased 
results.281 Therefore, the enabling statute for the AWA should provide for an 
agency led by a Commission of five to seven members, rather than a Direc-
tor or Administrator. A Commission can better resist political pressures and 
can make unpopular choices without fear of reprisal or backlash.282 
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Another important way to maintain agency independence and protect 
against infiltration of presidential and private interests would involve in-
cluding a provision limiting the number of Commissioners affiliated with 
the President’s political party.283 Such a provision would ensure fair politi-
cal distribution, diminish partisan imbalance, and prevent skewed policy 
objectives. For example, a Commission of five might include at least two 
Commissioners that are members of a political party other than the Presi-
dent’s. A Commission of seven would have at least three members of a dif-
ferent party than the President. Commissioners must also have terms that 
are longer than the President’s so as to ensure continuity and agency stabil-
ity, and also to protect against the President appointing the entire Commis-
sion and thus controlling the agency’s allegiance.284 Therefore, the AWA’s 
Commissioners should have six-year staggered terms. This would ensure 
that no one President dictates the AWA’s policy aims. It would also facilitate 
the seamless accumulation of expertise.285 
2. Authority to Ensure Animal Welfare 
In addition to providing an independent structure, the AWA’s enabling 
statute must pronounce with clarity the purpose and authority vested in the 
agency. The AWA’s mission should be the protection of all animals from 
cruelty—including and indeed especially agricultural animals—from birth 
until death.286 The AWA must have the authority to regulate and ensure the 
proper treatment and conditions of animals when they are young, as they 
mature, during transport, and up to and during slaughter.287 Unlike Brazil, 
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the United States does not have a constitutional provision to guide the agen-
cy’s mandate.288 And, as previously discussed, the United States has a woe-
fully deficient regulatory regime that will require a number of statutory fix-
es.289 Any new laws seeking to protect agricultural animals will almost cer-
tainly fail if they fall under the regulatory aegis of an agency that is over-
taxed with respect to its resources and guided by a mission that conflicts 
with animal welfare.290 
One of the principal challenges facing the creation of the AWA lies with 
the fact that the enabling statute must also take the form of a reorganization 
statute. In other words, all existing statutory authority for animal welfare must 
be re-delegated from existing agencies to the AWA.291 This would involve 
shifting regulatory authority mainly from the Department of Agriculture.292 
Statutes that implicate animal welfare likely will require amendment or a 
comprehensive reorganization.293 This reorganization would be onerous at 
any time, but the current political climate, rife as it is with antagonism, mis-
trust, and gridlock, makes it harder still. 
Another significant challenge exists with respect to preemption of state 
laws.294 Large agricultural interests will seek guarantees that complying 
with federal regulations will excuse them from having to comply with the 
many and varied state laws. Permitting preemption would, in the authors’ 
opinion, be a significant mistake as states may wish to lead on animal pro-
tection issues by enacting laws and regulations more progressive than those 
passed at the federal level. 
B. An Animal Welfare Agency in Brazil 
Over the past twenty years, Brazil has developed its regulatory sector 
to include numerous independent agencies that focus on everything from 
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water allocation to electricity.295 Given the proliferation of independent 
agencies and the presence of the requisite political will, an Animal Welfare 
Agency could also emerge. The Brazilian Animal Welfare Agency (“AWA”) 
should be an independent agency because independent agencies can insulate 
themselves from executive and political influence.296 In the sections that 
follow, we describe the institutional structure, delegated authority, and re-
sponsibilities that the AWA would be assigned.297 
1. Structure to Ensure Independence 
Like the United States, Brazilian law requires an enabling statute to 
create an independent agency.298 This statute creates the agency, outlines its 
structure, and delegates the necessary authority for it to function.299 The 
structural details found in the enabling act define the type of agency and its 
degree of independence. In Brazil, the main factors that establish an agency 
as independent include the selection method of agency officials, the type of 
leadership, the term length of officials, the removal procedure for officials, 
and the agency’s financial independence.300 
The AWA’s enabling statute must ensure that the agency’s structure ac-
counts for and incorporates each of these factors, to avoid the political in-
fluence of the agricultural lobby and the primacy of political and economic 
interests.301 To do this, the statute must ensure that the Agency’s head offic-
ers are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.302 Senate 
confirmation checks the President’s ability to simply appoint individuals 
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who echo a particular political viewpoint or agenda.303 This procedure is 
already commonplace for independent agencies in Brazil.304 As in the Unit-
ed States, a Commission made up of five to seven members provides for 
greater independence because, unlike a single Director or Minister, the Pres-
ident is less likely to convince all Commissioners to pursue a specific goal 
or agenda.305 
In addition to mandating the commission structure, the enabling statute 
should also prevent the appointment of all Commissioners from the same 
party. Partisan balance is more challenging in Brazil than in the United 
States because Brazil has a multi-party system.306 With so many parties rep-
resented in the federal government, it would be difficult to ensure that all 
are represented on a panel of five to seven Commissioners. Therefore, the 
best option may involve requiring that no more than two Commissioners be 
from the President’s party with the rest coming from various other factions. 
Furthermore, given the strong agricultural industry forces, Commissioners 
should not have business or economic interests related to the work or busi-
ness undertaken by the AWA.307 This categorical bar would include an ex-
ception for veterinarians and those engaged in non-profit work that clearly 
focuses on animal welfare. 
The terms of the Commissioners should be staggered and exceed four 
years (the presidential term length).308 This way, no single President can 
control the agency and its policies. And, because Commissioners’ terms 
outlive the presidential term, there is more incentive to pursue sound, non-
politically influenced policies.309 In addition, Commissioners should be on-
ly removable for cause.310 This type of agency structure is not uncommon 
in Brazil. For example, the National Water Agency’s enabling statute allows 
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at will removal only for the first four months of a Director’s term.311 After 
that, removal must be for cause.312 
Finally, the agency must be financially independent. If the President or 
Congress alone can withhold funding when unhappy with the agency’s de-
cisions or policies, then the agency is no longer insulated from political ma-
neuvering. However, Brazilian agencies do often acquire some measure of 
financial autonomy when their enabling statutes stipulate that funding come 
predominantly from fees and fines collected by the agencies and that those 
fees be used only for their respective regulatory agendas.313 In practice, this 
may be difficult to achieve, as the President has authority over appropria-
tions and budgets, even those derived from independent sources (i.e., the 
agency’s own revenue).314 This hurdle cannot be defeated by any enabling 
statute and presents an ongoing struggle for the Brazilian regulatory state.315 
2. Authority to Ensure Animal Welfare 
Beyond its independent structure, the AWA must also have a purpose 
and significant authority to serve that purpose. As with the AWA in United 
States, the Brazilian AWA’s mission should be to safeguard animals against 
cruelty from birth until death. The enabling statute must delegate significant 
authority to serve that purpose. Fortunately, unlike in the United States, 
there is an explicit constitutional mandate that the government protect ani-
mal welfare.316 The AWA must have the authority not only to enforce viola-
tions of the Constitution, but also to enforce all federal legislation and exist-
ing regulation that supports that constitutional mandate and involves the 
protection of animal welfare.317 Ultimately, all legal mechanisms that cur-
rently exist within Permanent Technical Commission on Animal Welfare 
and other agencies must be aggregated and consolidated into the AWA. 
The benefit of a clear mission focusing solely on animals without re-
gard to agricultural interests, economic interests, and transnational business 
interests, is that each phase of the animal’s life can be governed by con-
sistent standards. The AWA’s independence and clarity of mission (i.e., pro-
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tection of animals from cruelty) would further ensure that existing legisla-
tive and constitutional goals for prevention of animal cruelty were success-
fully served. The agency’s mandate would also provide a strong foundation 
from which to improve standards across the board. 
C. Benefits of an Independent Agency for Animal Welfare 
An agency whose mission is solely animal welfare could have an im-
mediate and beneficial effect. The enabling statute would give it regulatory 
authority and a mandate to ease the lives of billions of animals whose cur-
rent existence is nothing short of gruesome.318 What follows are just a few 
examples of how it might operate. 
First, the AWA could review current farming practices to determine if 
the industry’s chosen methods cause needless suffering. Under the current 
regulatory regime, necessity (when it is even considered) is determined with 
respect to the economic gains such methods produce.319 The AWA would 
prioritize the animal’s experience. 
Thus, for example, even if docking pigs’ tails enables them to be 
penned in closer quarters, leading to more pigs per square foot and more 
profit, the AWA would consider the impact of this procedure on the pig and 
analyze whether it is necessary to the functioning of the industry.320 Among 
the things the agency might consider would be the current mortality rate at 
industrial facilities, the mortality rate if the animals were given more space, 
scientific data regarding the natural habits of the animals, and, of course, 
whether docking tails causes the pigs to suffer.321 The conclusion would 
almost certainly be that the animals require more space and that tail-
docking causes needless suffering.322 
Second, the AWA could enable improved prosecutorial capability and 
encourage public involvement. This new agency could welcome evidence 
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of animal welfare violations from animal advocates and encourage individ-
uals to provide evidence to law enforcement.323 Currently, in both the Unit-
ed States and Brazil, the prosecutor is often overburdened with other cases 
and sometimes politically tied to the interest of the industry, and, thus, en-
forcement seldom occurs.324 A federal agency dedicated to the protection of 
animal welfare would entrench norms that could then permeate into the fed-
eral, state, and local regimes. 
Third, because the AWA—rather than the entire agricultural indus-
try—will regulate agricultural animal welfare, the agency can play a key 
role in providing expertise, investigation, and information that would more 
objectively design or contribute to the industry’s operation in a way that 
protects animals from mistreatment. This is similar to the impacts of other 
federal statutes and agencies. For example, the Energy Policy and Conser-
vation Act regulates mileage standards for the auto industry, forcing techno-
logical upgrades as well as impacting manufacturing choices.325 With re-
spect to the AWA, the statute could give the agency authority to influence 
industry choices through tax credits for purchases of equipment that pro-
mote humane treatment.326 
The foregoing offer just a few of the many ways that the AWA could 
improve agricultural animal welfare—as well as animal welfare as it per-
tains to all animals—in two of the world’s largest economies, the United 
States and Brazil. If either or both countries were to create such agencies, 
and new and effective welfare standards were to result, that would combine 
with the European Union’s existing regulations to reduce the suffering quo-
tient of billions of the world’s animals. 
CONCLUSION 
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that while each country has a dif-
ferent statutory and regulatory regime, both countries arrive at a similar re-
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sult: widespread mistreatment of agricultural animals. The United States 
lacks statutes that adequately address animal welfare. The few laws that do 
address animal treatment are plagued with exemptions, are not regulated 
and enforced, or are more concerned with the animal once it is dead. Brazil, 
on the other hand, has several statutes prohibiting cruelty towards animals 
and, more importantly, a constitutional provision that explicitly recognizes 
fundamental rights for animals.327 Yet despite these protections, Brazilian 
agricultural animals continue to suffer due to inadequate enforcement and 
widespread mistreatment. 
The process toward a more humane agricultural animal treatment re-
gime requires two steps. First, a statutory regime must be in place that de-
fines and outlines the scope of animal welfare and the protections owed to 
animals. Second, there must be an effective method to implement the legal 
protections provided in step one. The United States is at step one; the gov-
ernment has yet to develop and enact legislation or regulations that suffi-
ciently protect agricultural animals. Brazil has significant work to do for 
step one; European Union standards are present in Brazil, but are voluntary 
while statutes prohibiting animal cruelty are rarely prosecuted. Brazil is also 
struggling with step two, as it lacks an effective way to enforce the statutory 
and constitutional legal protections already in place. 
An agency whose principal mission is animal welfare enables the nec-
essary regulations to overcome step one and also dissolve the obstacles that 
plague step two. We have no illusions that the “solution” offered herein is 
simple, easy, or final. However, it does provide a step in the right direction, 
a step toward recognition that animal lives matter—whether they be pets or 
livestock. It would further require ongoing scrutiny of industry practices 
with the lives and well-being on the animals at the forefront of the analysis. 
Of course, this agency will not eliminate cruelty. It would rather mark 
the beginning of a long overdue domestic and international conversation 
about the importance of animal welfare. That conversation would perhaps 
mark the beginning of an equally overdue conversation about the nature of 
our relationship with the nonhuman world. We look forward to both. As T.S. 
Eliot once said, “HURRY UP PLEASE IT’S TIME.”328 
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